In this paper, we first describe a framework to model the sponsored search auction on the web as a mechanism design problem. Using this framework, we design a novel auction which we call the OPT (optimal) 
Introduction
The advertiser-supported web site is one of the successful business models in the emerging web landscape. In today's web advertising industry, Search Ads constitute the highest revenue generating model among all Internet advertising formats. In a typical search engine like Google, the results of a search query has two different stacks side by side -the left stack contains the links that are most relevant to the query term and the right stack contains the sponsored links. Typically, a number of merchants (advertisers) are interested in advertising alongside the search results of a keyword. However, the number of slots available to display the sponsored links is limited. Therefore, against every search performed by the user, the search engine faces the problem of matching the advertisers to the slots. In addition, the search engine also needs to decide on a price to be charged to each advertiser.
In this paper, we are interested in studying appropriate mechanisms for sponsored search auction and investigate their performance.
The motivation for our work comes from several recent research articles. The work of [2] investigates the Generalized Second Price (GSP) mechanism for sponsored search auction under static settings. Our approach generalizes their analysis to the more realistic case of incomplete information through a detailed analysis of the induced Bayesian game. Another strand of work which is closely related to ours is due to [5] . The objective of this paper is to clarify the incentive, efficiency, and revenue properties of the two popular slot auctions -first price and second price, under settings of incomplete and complete information. The work does not attempt to derive any optimal mechanism. In [3] , author studies the allocation mechanisms under a setting in which the advertisers have a consistent ranking of advertising positions but different rates of decrease in absolute valuation. The model and underlying assumptions of this paper are quite different than ours. A recent paper [8] analyzes the equilibria of an assignment game that arises in the context of Ad auctions. In another related work by [1] , the authors design a simple truthful auction for a general class of ranking functions that includes direct ranking and revenue ranking.
In Section 2, we first develop a framework to model the sponsored search auction problem as a mechanism design problem. We then pursue the objective of designing a mechanism that satisfies the following requirements, which we believe are practical requirements for any sponsored search auction: (1) revenue maximization for the search engine; (2) individual rationality for the advertisers; and (3) Bayesian incentive compatibility of the mechanism. Motivated by this, in Section 3, we propose a new mechanism which we call the Optimal (OPT) mechanism. We then analyze the OPT mechanism assuming symmetric advertisers. Our analysis shows that the expected revenue earned by the search engine is the same for all the three mechanisms (GSP, VCG, and OPT) provided the advertisers are symmetric and the number of sponsored slots is strictly less than the number of advertisers.
Sponsored Search Auction as a Mechanism Design Problem in Linear Environment
Consider a search engine that has received a query from an Internet user and it faces the problem of selling its advertising space among the available advertisers for this particular query word. We make the following assumptions.
( (2) α i j is the probability that a user will click on the i th advertiser's Ad if it is displayed in the j th position (slot), where the first position refers to the top most position. We assume that the following condition is satisfied.
Note here that we are assuming that click probability α i j does not depend on which other advertiser has been allocated to what other position. (3) Each advertiser precisely knows the value derived out of each click performed by the user on his Ad but does not know the value derived out of a single user-click by the other advertisers. Note that this value should be independent of the position of the Ad and should only depend on whether or not a user clicks on the Ad. Formally, this is modeled by supposing that advertiser i observes a parameter, or signal θ i that represents his value for each user click. The parameter θ i is referred to as advertiser i's type. The set of possible types of advertiser i is denoted by
b e the corresponding PDF. We assume that the θ i takes values from a closed interval
We also assume that any advertiser's valuation is statistically independent from any other advertiser's valuation. That is, Φ i
n are mutually independent. This is the classical independent private values assumption.
(5) Each advertiser i is rational and intelligent and this fact is modeled by assuming that the advertisers always try to maximize a utility function
, where X is the set of outcomes which will be defined shortly.
(6) The probability distribution functions Φ i W Y X à , the type sets Θ 1
Θ n , and the utility functions u i W I X` a re assumed to be common knowledge among the advertisers. Note that utility function u i W I X` o f advertiser i depends on both the outcome x and the type θ i . The type θ i is not a common knowledge; but by saying that u i W Y X à is common knowledge we mean that for any given type θ i , the auctioneer (that is, search engine in this case) and every other advertiser can evaluate the utility function of advertiser i.
A sponsored search auction can be viewed as an indirect mechanism
, where B i r s g 7 t
is the set of bids that an advertiser i can report to the search engine and g W I X` i s an allocation and payment rule. Note, if we assume that for each advertiser i, the set of bids B i is the same as the type set Θ i , then the indirect mechanism
b ecomes the allocation and payment rule. In the rest of this paper, we will assume that B i
Thus, we regard a sponsored search auction as a direct revelation mechanism. The various components of a typical sponsored search mechanism design problem are listed below.
1. An outcome in the case of sponsored search auction may be represented by a vector x D W Through a slight modification in the definition of allocation rule, payment rule, and utility functions, we can show that sponsored search auction is indeed a mechanism in linear environment. To transform the underlying environment to a linear one, we redefine the allocation and payment rule as below. Now, we can rewrite the utility functions in following manner
bPc an be interpreted as the probability that advertiser i will receive a user click whenever there is a search query received by the search engine and when the bid vector of the advertisers is b
. Now, it is easy to verify that the underlying environment is linear.
The OPT Mechanism for Sponsored Search Auction
Both the commonly used mechanisms GSP and VCG can be shown to be individually rational [4] . However, we can show that the GSP mechanism is not Bayesian incentive compatible by following a line of attack similar to the one used by McAfee and McMillan [6] to compute the equilibrium bidding strategy of the buyers during the auction of a single indivisible good. The VCG mechanism, on the other hand, is dominant strategy incentive compatible, by design itself; however, it is known to lead to significantly high levels of incentives to be paid to the advertisers. This brings down the revenue of the search engine.
The above two factors motivate us to look for a mechanism for sponsored search auction that maximizes the revenue to the search engine subject to individual rationality and Bayesian incentive compatibility. Myerson [7] first studied such an auction mechanism in the context of selling a single indivisible good. Our goal in this paper is to compute the allocation and payment rule f W I X` t hat results in an optimal mechanism for the sponsored search auction. This calls for extending Myerson's optimal auction to the case of the sponsored search auction. We follow a line of attack which is similar to that of [7] .
is the probability that advertiser i will receive a user click if he bids an amount b i and all the advertisers j m D i bid their true types.
ives advertiser i's expected utility from the mechanism conditional on his type being θ i when he and all other advertisers bid their true types.
The problem of designing an optimal mechanism for the sponsored search auction can now be written as one of
In the above formulation, the objective function is the total expected payment received by the search engine from all the advertisers. Note that constraints (iv) are the advertisers' interim individual rationality constraints while constraint (ii) is the feasibility constraint. Constraints (i) and (iii) are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the allocation and payment rule f
M to be Bayesian incentive compatible. These constraints are taken from [7] . We have a critical observation to make here. Note that in the above optimization problem, we have replaced the bid b i by the actual type θ i . This is because we are imposing the Bayesian incentive compatibility constraints on the allocation and payment rule and, hence, every advertiser will bid his true type. Thus, while dealing with the OPT mechanism, we can safely interchange θ i and b i for any i V N. Define, as in [7] , J i
Then, following the same line of arguments as in [7] , we can derive that . It is easy to write down the following expression: 
Summary
In this paper, we formulated the sponsored search auction as a mechanism design problem in linear environment. Next, we proposed a new mechanism, called the OPT mechanism which improves upon the two most commonly used mechanisms GSP and VCG. We extended the classical revenue equivalence theorem to the setting of sponsored search auction and used it to show the revenue equivalence of the three mechanisms.
